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Background
 Work on Reserve Generation
 Events of 2001
 Recent political musings on deintegration
Presentation Format
 Present a highly stylised model of vertical 
integration in the electricity industry
 Draw policy conclusions about competition 
policy in the model
 General discussion about relevance to actual 
New Zealand electricity market
What is the difference between a 
coulomb and a widget?
(That is, what makes the electricity industry 
unique)
 Geographical separation between production 
and consumption…
…with energy loss in transmission
 Natural Monopoly for grid and line 
infrastructure
 Supply uncertainty
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So what makes this an electricty-
sector model?
 We assume separation between a wholesale 
market and a retail market
 The wholesale market is cleared by a uniform-price 
auction
 The retail market is an oligopoly of price-setting, 
quantity-taking firms competing for consumers
 But, we assume away final users buying directly 
from the wholesale market
 Two stage game:
 Retailers post prices for committed supply
 In wholesale market generators make sealed bids 
to supply aggregated demand bids by retailers 
(price-inelastic), with single market-clearing price
 Generators overstate or understate their true 
supply curves by some constant scale factor
Model Set-Up
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Main Result
 With vertical separation, it is always optimal for 
generation firms to overstate their true supply 
curves—that is, there is always monopoly power 
in the market.
 The incentive to overstate increases with each 
firm’s share of total capacity
Vertical Integration
 With vertical integration, generation firms have 
an incentive to overstate their true supply curves 
to the extent that their wholesale market share 
exceeds their retail market share. 
 If all generators’ share of total generation 
capacity exactly equals their retail market share, 
there is a unique equilibrium with all generators 
truly reporting their supply curves. 
Policy Discussion (within model)
 Base assumptions:
 Firms are consumer-exploiting, profit maximisers
 And quite right too!
Policy Results:
 Competition requires atomistic markets
 Or balanced integration
 Static optimisation looks like predatory pricing
 But such predation O.K.
 Given degree of monopoly in retail, same 
concentration at wholesale is probably good
Policy Speculations
 Market-share balance is possibly a natural 
dynamic outcome in the market
 Probably a good thing to have some wholesale-
only generator balancing the final-use wholesale 
buyers
 Whirinaki possibly makes more sense as a daily 
extension of competiton policy than as reserve 
generation vehicle
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Hydro level vs. Prices 2001
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